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the consequence argument  
and the definition of determinism
cristoPher huGhes
Resumo
Peter van Inwagen no seu An Essay of Free Will e, no muito mais tarde, “The Consequence 
Argument” formula várias versões daquilo que designou por “o argumento de consequência”. 
van Inwagen descreveu o “argumento da consequência” como um argumento para a 
incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Contudo, o autor deste artigo 
argumenta que a mais recente formulação do argumento da consequência não é, tal como 
está, um argumento para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Embora 
possa ser transformado em um, não parece haver nenhuma maneira simples de transformá-lo 
em um argumento convincente para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio 
(ou mesmo, para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio humano). Por 
isso, sugere-se, para a construção de um argumento convincente para a incompatibilidade 
do determinismo com o livre-arbítrio, que a melhor aposta passa pela reconstrução de uma 
definição do determinismo substancialmente diferente da de van Inwagen.
Palavras-chave  : argumento da consequência, determinismo, livre arbítrio, metafísica, 
van Inwagen
Abstract
In  An Essay on Free Will, and in the much later “The  Consequence Argument” Peter 
van Inwagen formulated various versions of what he calls “the consequence argument”. 
van Inwagen has described the consequence argument as an argument for the incompatibility 
of determinism with free will. But, I  argue, the latest formulation of the consequence 
argument is not, as it stands, an argument for the incompatibility of determinism with free 
will. Although it can be turned into one, there does not seem to be any straightforward way 
of turning it into a cogent argument for the incompatibility of determinism with free will (or 
even, for the incompatibility of determinism with human free will). I suggest that if we want 
to construct a cogent argument for the incompatibility of determinism with free will, our best 
bet is to start with a definition of determinism substantially different from van Inwagen’s.
Keywords  : consequence argument, determinism, free will, metaphysics, van Inwagen
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In An Essay On Free Will, Peter van Inwagen sets out the following 
argument:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of 
nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on 
before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature 
are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present 
acts) are not up to us.1
As van Inwagen says, this formulation of (what he calls) the 
consequence argument is not as careful and detailed as the three that 
follow it (in An Essay On Free Will). In  “The  Consequence Argument”, 
van Inwagen offers a fourth formulation of the argument, which turns on 
the notion of untouchability. For van Inwagen,
An untouchable proposition is a true proposition that is such that 
nothing that anyone is or ever has been able to do might have had the 
consequence that it is false.2
As van Inwagen sees it, the following principles are necessary truths 
about untouchability:
(α)  If P is a necessary truth, then P is untouchable.
and
(β) If both P and if P then Q are untouchable, so too is Q.
Also, as van Inwagen sees it,
(γ)  Determinism logically implies that if P is any true proposition, the 
(whole) truth about the (intrinsic) state of the universe at some 
arbitrary moment of the (remote) past, together with the (whole) 
truth about the laws of nature, logically implies P.
1. VaN INwaGeN, Peter – An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 16 
and 56.
2. “The Consequence Argument”. In: VaN INwaGeN, P. & ZimmeRmaN, D. – Metaphysics: 
The Big Questions, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008 (e-accessible on <URL: http: /  / www.
andrewmbailey.com / pvi / >), p. 4.
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Given (α) – (γ) van Inwagen argues, we may move from the premiss 
that determinism is true to the conclusion that there is no free will. 
van Inwagen’s path from the premiss to the conclusion is (essentially) the 
following:
 (1)  Suppose that determinism is true. Then, by (γ), we may 
conclude that, where P0 is a (true) proposition (simply) 
specifying the complete (intrinsic) state of the universe at some 
arbitrary moment of the (remote) past, and L is the conjunction 
into a single proposition of all the laws of nature, and P is an 
arbitrary truth, if P0 and L, then P is a necessary truth. Hence 
(by elementary logic) if Po, then: if L then P is a necessary truth.
 (2) By (α), all necessary truths are untouchable truths.
 (3)  So if Po, then: if L, then P is an untouchable truth.
 (4)  In  which case, by (β), if P0 is untouchable, then so is the 
conditional, if L, then P. (β) says that if both the antecedent 
of a conditional and the conditional itself are untouchable, so 
too is the consequent of that conditional. (3) says that a certain 
conditional (if P0, then if L, then P) is untouchable. So, given 
(β) assuming that the antecedent of that conditional (P0) is 
untouchable, so too is its consequent (if L, then P).
 (5) Moreover, P0 is in fact untouchable.
 (6) Hence the conditional, if L, then P is untouchable.
 (7) So, (by (β) again), if L is untouchable, so is P.
 (8) Moreover, L is in fact untouchable.
 (9) So P is untouchable.
(10)  From (1) – (9), we know that if determinism is true, then every 
truth is untouchable. And  if every truth is untouchable, then 
there is no such thing as free will. Whence we may conclude that 
if determinism is true, then there is no such thing as free will.
This argument is (manifestly) an argument for the (truth of the) 
conditional, if determinism is true, then there is no such thing as free will. 
van Inwagen also thinks of it as an argument for incompatibilism – that 
is, as an argument for the denial that “free will and determinism can 
co-exist”.3
3. Ibidem, p. 13.
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It is not immediately evident, though, that the above argument is (as 
it stands) an argument for incompatibilism (as van Inwagen understands 
it). For that argument only gets from determinism to the non-existence of 
free will via (α) – (γ), the (current) untouchability of the intrinsic character 
of the universe at some time the (remote) past, and the untouchability of the 
laws of nature. Hence that argument seems not to rule out the possibility 
that determinism (in and of itself) is compatible with the existence of 
free will, even though the conjunction of determinism with (α) – (γ), the 
untouchability of the intrinsic character of the universe at some time in 
the (remote) past, and the untouchability of the laws of natures is not 
compatible with the existence of free will.
Of course, if determinism, (α) – (γ), the untouchability of the 
intrinsic character of the universe at some time in the (remote) past, and 
the untouchability of the laws of nature are jointly incompatible with free 
will, but determinism itself is compatible with free will, then at least one 
of (α) – (γ), the untouchability of the intrinsic character of the universe 
at some time in the (remote) past, and the untouchability of the laws of 
nature is at most contingently true (given that, whenever P and Q are 
jointly incompatible with R, and Q is a necessary truth, P is incompatible 
with R).
And who would think that at least one of (α) – (γ), the untouchability 
of the intrinsic character of the universe at some time in the (remote) past, 
and the untouchability of the laws of nature is at most contingently true? 
On the face of it, anyone who thinks that, whether or not it’s in fact true 
that God (as usually conceived) exists, it might have been true. Theists 
typically hold that ante omnia saecula God chose the laws of nature. 
For instance, (ignoring relativistic complications) He decided, say, that the 
gravitational force between bodies with masses m1 and m2 would be equal 
to Gm1m2  /  r
 2 (where G is the gravitational constant, and r is the distance 
between the centers of mass of m1 and m2). He might instead have decided 
that it would be G´m1m2  /  r
 2, for some G´ not equal to G. In  that case, 
there would have been a different law of universal gravitation, and the 
actual law of universal gravitation would have been false; accordingly the 
proposition L (a conjunction one of whose conjuncts is the law of universal 
gravitation) would have been false. So, theists hold, there is something 
that someone (or Someone) was able to do which would have had, and a 
fortiori might have had, the consequence that L was false. In other words, 
L is not an untouchable truth. Whether or not theists are right to think 
that God ante omnia saecula had a choice about the laws of nature, as long 
as there might have been a God who (ante omnia saecula) had a choice 
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about the laws of nature, it is at most contingently true that the laws of 
nature (and L) are untouchable.
Although I  shall for the most part set issues concerning the 
untouchability of the past to one side, it may be worth pointing out that, 
as long as there might have been a (traditionally conceived) God who 
antedated the universe, it will be at most contingently true that the 
intrinsic character of the universe at some past time (however remote) is 
untouchable. Where t is any past time in the history of the universe, and Pt 
is a (true) proposition that (simply) specifies the complete (intrinsic) state 
of the universe at t, a (traditionally conceived) God who existed before the 
universe did would (at some time prior to the existence of the universe) 
have had the ability to do something which would (and a fortiori might) 
have had the consequence that Pt was false. A (traditionally conceived) 
God  would have that ability, even if He  didn’t antedate the universe 
(inasmuch as both He and the universe had an infinite past), since it would 
still be true that, for any time past time t, and true proposition Pt (simply) 
specifying the complete (intrinsic) state of the universe at t, (at some time 
before t) God had the ability to do something that would and a fortiori 
might have had as a consequence the falsity of Pt.
In  fact, though, it seems that we cannot establish that either the 
untouchability of the intrinsic character of the universe at some time in 
the (remote) past or the untouchability of the laws is at most a contingent 
truth, simply by appeal to the possibility of (a traditional) God. It is true 
that in his “official definition” of untouchability already cited, van Inwagen 
says that
An untouchable proposition is a true proposition that is such that 
nothing that anyone is or ever has been able to do might have had the 
consequence that it is false.
But  at an earlier point in the article, he introduces the notion of 
untouchability as follows:
Some truths, however, are not up to anyone (to any human being). 
For example: that human beings exist, that the earth has a large moon, 
that the presence of mass changes the local curvature of spacetime, that 
there is no largest prime number. Let us call a true proposition whose 
truth is up to no one (to no human being, past, present, or future) an 
untouchable proposition.4
4. Ibidem, p. 3.
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So van Inwagen holds that an untouchable proposition is a true 
proposition such that nothing that any human being is or ever has been (or 
ever will be) able to do might have had (or might have) the consequence 
that it is is false. (For this reason, van Inwagen considers it obvious that 
truths about the pre-human past are untouchable,5 and says that the laws 
of nature are untouchable truths, inasmuch as “as far as human beings 
(at any rate) are concerned, the laws of nature are just there”6).
Let us say that a true proposition such that nothing that any human 
being is or ever has been (or ever will be) able to do might have had 
(or might have) the consequence that it is false, a humanly untouchable 
proposition. (“Humanly untouchable” is modeled on the more familiar 
“humanly impossible” (i.e. not humanly possible).) Let us call a true 
proposition such that nothing that a divine being is or ever was (or ever 
will be) able to do might have had (or might have) the consequence that it 
is false, a divinely untouchable proposition. (Something exists or something 
existed would presumably be a divinely untouchable proposition). 
Finally,  let us call a true proposition such that nothing anyone (human, 
divine….) is or ever has been (or ever will be) able to do might have had 
(or might have) the consequence that it is false an absolutely untouchable 
proposition. (Something exists or something existed would presumably be 
absolutely as well as divinely untouchable).
Now it seems that, on the assumption that there is, or at any rate there 
might have been (a traditional) God, the divine and absolute untouchability 
of the (intrinsic) character of the universe at some time in its (remote) 
past, and the divine and the absolute untouchability of the laws of nature, 
are at most contingently true. But, it might be maintained, this is perfectly 
compatible with the human untouchability of the intrinsic character of the 
universe at some time in its (remote) past and the human untouchability 
of the laws being necessary truths; and, whatever a less than careful 
reader might think, what van Inwagen means by “the untouchability of 
the intrinsic character of the universe in the (remote) past and of the laws” 
is the human (rather than the absolute) untouchability of the intrinsic 
character of the universe in the (remote) past and of the laws.
Let us return to the overall structure of the new formulation of the 
consequence argument. It involves moving from (a) determinism is true to 
(b) every truth is untouchable and thence to (c) there is no such thing as free 
will. If by “untouchability” van Inwagen meant what I have called absolute 
5. Ibidem, p. 9
6. Ibidem, p. 11 (my emphasis on “for human beings, at any rate”).
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untouchability, then the passage from (b) to (c) would on the face of it be 
straightforward. But when van Inwagen says that “if every true proposition 
is an untouchable truth, then free will simply does not exist” (p. 13), 
what he appears to mean is that if every true proposition is a humanly 
untouchable truth, then free will simply does not exist. And why should the 
fact that every true proposition is humanly untouchable imply that angelic 
or divine free will does not exist (unless of course human untouchability 
implies absolute and thus angelic and divine untouchability, which would 
take us back to our original (theological) worry about whether premiss (8) 
of our argument is at most contingently true)?
This difficulty is obviated, if we suppose that, in much the way that 
untouchability, as van Inwagen understands it in the argument, is human 
untouchability, free will, as van Inwagen understands it in the argument, 
is human free will. On this construal, our argument is (as it stands) an 
argument for the incompatibility of determinism and certain additional 
premisses with the existence of human free will. Assuming that not just 
(α) – (γ), but also the (human) untouchability of the intrinsic character 
of the universe at some time in the (remote) past and the (human) 
untouchability of the laws of nature, are necessary truths, our argument can 
easily enough be turned into what van Inwagen (more or less) describes 
it as—to wit, an argument for the incompatibility of determinism with 
(human) free will (by opportunely replacing premisses such as (5) and (8) 
with their necessitations). (For brevity, I shall call this last argument the 
modified consequence argument, or the modified argument).
But it looks as though the modified argument won’t work. As we have 
seen, van Inwagen says that
An untouchable proposition is a true proposition that is such that 
nothing that anyone is or ever has been able to do might have had the 
consequence that it is false.
– where “anyone” should be understood as “any human being.” If  an 
untouchable proposition is (per definitionem) a true proposition satisfying 
a certain additional condition, then untouchability implies truth. 
If  untouchability implies truth, then necessary untouchability implies 
necessary truth. So suppose we modify van Inwagen’s 2008 formulation 
of the consequence argument by (inter alia) replacing premiss (8) with its 
necessitation. The necessitated version of premiss (8) will imply that L is 
a necessary truth. Surely, though, necessary truth implies not just human, 
but also divine and absolute untouchability: if P is necessarily true, there 
is nothing that a human being, or an angel, or God Himself could do that 
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might have as a consequence the falsity of P. So the envisaged modification 
of the 2008 version of the consequence argument does not after all give us 
an argument for the incompatibility of determinism with human free will 
that allows for the compatibility of determinism with divine free will; it 
gives us an argument for the incompatibility of determinism with free will 
(as such).
Suppose, though, we say that a proposition P is humanly touchable 
if and only if something that some human being was or is (or will be) 
able to do might have had (or might have) the consequence that P is false. 
And suppose we think that the following is a necessary truth:
If  P is a humanly touchable true proposition, and Q1 … Qn are true 
propositions that jointly imply I, at least one of Q1 …. Qn is humanly 
touchable. (Equivalently: if P is a humanly touchable true proposition, 
and Q1 …. Qn are true propositions that jointly imply P, then not all of 
Q1 …. Qn are humanly untouchable.)
(For readers who prefer formulations less freighted with P’s and Q’s, 
what this principle says is that no humanly touchable truth is (“singly”) 
implied by any humanly untouchable truth, and no humanly touchable 
truth is jointly implied by any truths all of which are humanly untouchable. 
In other words, what the principle says is that humanly touchable truths 
do not follow from humanly untouchable truths. (from truths all of which 
are humanly untouchable).
Given (the necessitation of) our principle, we could modify the 
2008  version of the consequence argument along something like the 
following lines:
(1´)  Necessarily, if determinism is true, then if P is an arbitrarily 
chosen true proposition, there is a pair of propositions P0 
and L which satisfy the following conditions: (a) P0 is a (true) 
proposition (simply) specifying the complete (intrinsic) state of 
the universe at some arbitrary moment the (remote) past, and 
L is a (true) proposition which is the conjunction into a single 
proposition of all the laws of nature, and (b) P0 and L jointly 
imply P. In other words, necessarily, if determinism is true, any 
truth is (jointly) implied by a true “maxi-specification” of the 
intrinsic character of the universe at some time in the (remote) 
past and a true “maxi-law” of nature.
(2´)  Necessarily, no maxi-specification of the intrinsic character 
of the universe at some time in the (remote) past is a humanly 
touchable truth.
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(3´)  Necessarily, no maxi-law of nature is a humanly touchable 
truth.
(4´)  Necessarily, if P is a humanly touchable truth, then P does not 
follow from any truths all of which are humanly untouchable 
(equivalently, from any truths none of which are humanly 
touchable). (This is just the necessitation of the principle set out 
above).
(5´)  Necessarily, if P is a humanly touchable truth, then P does not 
follow from any pair of true propositions, one of which is a 
maxi-specification of the intrinsic character of the universe at 
some time in the (remote) past, and one of which is a maxi-law 
of nature. (5´) follows straightforwardly from (2´) – (4´).)
(6’)  But  necessarily, if determinism is true, every true proposition 
follows from some pair of true propositions, one of which is a 
maxi-specification of the intrinsic character of the universe at 
some time in the (remote) past, and one of which is a maxi-law of 
nature (see premiss (1´)).
(7´)  So necessarily, if determinism is true, there are no humanly 
touchable truths (from (5´) and (6´)).
(8’)  Necessarily, if there are no humanly touchable truths, then there 
is no such thing as human free will.
(9´)  So necessarily, if determinism is true, then there is no such thing 
as human free will (from (7´) and (8´)).
This re-modification is not without its problems. To start with (1´), 
let us suppose that the world is deterministic, and has a first moment of 
existence, and that P
F is a true maxi-specification of the intrinsic character 
of the universe at its first moment of existence. PF won’t follow (simply) 
from any true proposition that is a maxi-law. But neither will PF follow 
from some true proposition that is a maxi-law, together with some true 
proposition that maxi-specifies the intrinsic character of the universe 
at some time (remote or otherwise) in the past. (That is, PF won’t follow 
from some true proposition that is a maxi-law, together with some true 
proposition maxi-specifying the intrinsic character of the universe at 
some time before the time at which PF is true; ex hypothesi there is no 
such time).
Moving on to (2´), although this raises some controversial questions 
concerning the nature of species, it is at least arguable that it might 
have been that the universe was the way Aristotle thought it actually 
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was – i.e. that universe had an infinite past, in which human beings had 
always existed.
If it could have been that the universe was that way, then it is at most 
contingently true that no maxi-specification of the intrinsic character of 
the universe at some time in the (remote) past is a humanly touchable truth 
(since it could have been that, for any past time t, and any true proposition 
Pt that maxi-specifies the intrinsic character of the universe at t, there was 
something some human being could have done at some time t´ prior to t 
that might have had the consequence that Pt was false).
A natural way to address both of the problems for the (re)modified 
argument just sketched would be to redraft the definition of touchability 
and untouchability, in such a way that, if P is a true proposition such that 
no human is or ever will be able to do anything that might result in the 
falsity of P, then P at most “ex-touchable”. Suppose we said:
A true proposition is humanly untouchable (at a time) if and only if 
nothing any human is or ever will be able to do (from that time on) 
might have the consequence that it is false.
And  suppose we also said that necessarily, no true proposition 
exclusively about the past and / or the present is humanly touchable. 
Then we could re-re-modify the 2008 version of the consequence argument 
to get something like this:
 (1´´)  Necessarily, if determinism is true, then at any (past, present, or 
future) time t, the following is true: if P is an arbitrarily chosen 
true proposition, there is a pair of propositions P´ and L which 
satisfy the following conditions: (a) P´ is a (true) proposition 
(simply) specifying the complete (intrinsic) state of the universe 
at some time no later than t, and L is a (true) proposition which 
is the conjunction into a single proposition of all the laws 
of nature, and (b) P´ and L jointly imply P. In  other words, 
necessarily, if determinism is true, then for any (past, present, 
or future) time t, any truth is jointly implied by a true “maxi-
specification” of the intrinsic character of the universe at some 
time no later than t and a true “maxi-law” of nature.
(2´´)  Necessarily, for any time t, no maxi-specification of the intrinsic 
character of the universe at a time no later than t is a humanly 
touchable truth (at t).
(3´´)  Necessarily, no maxi-law of nature is (ever) a humanly touchable 
truth.
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(4´´)  Necessarily, if P is a humanly touchable truth (at t), then P does 
not follow from any truths all of which are (then) humanly 
untouchable (equivalently, from any truths none of which are 
(then) humanly touchable).
(5´´)  Necessarily, for any time t, if P is a humanly touchable truth (at 
t), P does not follow from any pair of true propositions, one of 
which is a maxi-specification of the intrinsic character of the 
universe at a time no later than t, and one of which is a maxi-law 
of nature. (5´´) follows straightforwardly from (2´´) – (4´´).)
(6´´)  But  necessarily, if determinism is true, for any t, every true 
proposition follows from some pair of true propositions, one of 
which is a maxi-specification of the intrinsic character of the 
universe at a time no later than t, and one of which is a maxi-law 
of nature (see premiss (1´´)).
(7´´)  So necessarily, if determinism is true, there are no humanly 
touchable truths (from (5´´) and (6’’)).
(8´´)  Necessarily, if there are no humanly touchable truths, then there 
is no such thing as human free will.
(9´´)  So necessarily, if determinism is true, then there is no such 
thing as human free will (from (7´´) and (8´´)).
Is this an argument for the incompatility of determinism with human 
free will that could be accepted by someone who thinks that a traditional 
God is a possible being, and that determinism is accordingly compatible 
with the laws of nature being divinely and absolutely touchable (and up 
to God)?
It seems not. For  according to the definition of determinism 
presupposed in (1´´) (and the definition of determinism accepted by 
van Inwagen), necessarily, if determinism is true, then for any time 
t, the facts about the intrinsic character of the universe at any time t´ 
no later than t, together with the maxi-law of nature L, fix all the facts. 
(As van Inwagen puts it: “[d]eterminism says that the past (the past at any 
given instant, a complete specification of the universe at any given instant 
in the past) and the laws of nature together determine everything, that they 
leave open no possibilities whatever”.7) But  it seems very doubtful that 
there is any possible world in which both (i) there is a traditional God, and 
(ii) for any time t, the facts about the intrinsic character of the universe at 
7. Ibidem, p. 9.
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any time t’ no later than t, together with the maxi-law of nature L fix all the 
facts (which is to say, all the supernatural as well as all the natural facts). 
If there is such a world, then in it the facts about the intrinsic character 
of the universe at some time no later than t, together with the maxi-law 
of nature L, fix all the facts about God. But how could the facts about 
the intrinsic character of the universe at t´, together with the maxi-law 
of nature, as van Inwagen puts it, “leave open no possibilities whatever” 
concerning how the God who existed in that possible world was, assuming 
that that God was a traditional God (a supernatural, transcendent being, 
outside nature and not subject to its laws)? If  someone convinced me 
that the facts about the intrinsic character of the universe at some past 
time or at the present time, together with the maxi-law of nature L fixed 
all the facts, I would on that basis conclude forthwith that there was no 
(traditional) God.
So it looks as though, for anyone who wants to leave room for 
compatibility of determinism with the divine touchability of the laws of 
nature, the definition of determinism presupposed by (1´´) is too strong. 
We could weaken that definition, and end up with something like:
For any time t, the facts about the intrinsic character of the universe 
at any time t´ no later than t, together with the maxi-law of nature L, 
fix all the facts about the intrinsic character of the universe at any time 
whatever.
Incidentally, on this understanding of determinism, as on 
van Inwagen’s understanding, in a deterministic universe, the intrinsic 
character of the universe in the recent past and the maxi-law of nature 
jointly determine / imply the intrinsic character of the universe in 
the remote past, in exactly the same way that the intrinsic character 
of the universe in the recent past and the maxi-law of nature jointly 
determine / imply the intrinsic character of the universe now and in the 
future. If we want to avoid this consequence (because we (not unnaturally) 
think of determinism as a thesis about how the future depends on the past) 
we can say that determinism says something like:
For  any time t, and any initial bit of the history of the universe 
whose last moment is t (where a bit of history might be as short as a 
mathematical instant, but might also be an infinitely long period of 
time) the facts about the intrinsic character of the universe throughout 
that bit of history and the maxi-law of nature jointly determine / imply 
the facts about the intrinsic character of the universe throughout the 
rest of history.
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On either of the last two ways of understanding determinism, it is a 
thesis to the effect that certain facts about the (complete) intrinsic state the 
universe was or is in, together with the laws of nature, fix all the facts about 
the (complete) intrinsic states of the universe ever was or is or ever will 
be in. Both ways of understanding determinism are compatible with the 
supposition that even all the facts about how the universe is intrinsically 
throughout history, together with maxi-law of nature L, do not fix (all) the 
supernatural facts (all the facts about what supernatural beings there are, 
and what properties they are).
Suppose we modify (1´´), so that it presupposes something along the 
lines of one of the last two construals of determinism just sketched. Have we 
at last found an argument that for the incompatibility of determinism 
with human free will that leaves room for the idea that a traditional God 
is possible, and determinism is accordingly compatible with the laws of 
nature being divinely and absolutely touchable (and up to God)?
I  don’t think so. Suppose that L is the maxi-law of nature in the 
actual world—a maxi-law that includes the law that the gravitational 
force between any two bodies with masses m1 and m2 is (always) equal 
to Gm1m2 / r
 2., the law that bodies only accelerate when subject to a net 
force, and so on. Consider a possible world w in which L is true, and a 
maxi-law of nature, and in which there is a (traditional) God. Suppose 
further that in w someone petitions God to make it the case that tomorrow, 
for a particular pair of bodies b*1 and b*2 with masses m*1 and m*2, the 
gravitational force  between b*1 and b*2 will be a bit less than (or a bit 
greater than) Gm*1m*2 / r
 2. In w, God does not accede to the petitioner’s 
request (for His doing so would imply that the law of universal gravitation 
is false in w, and hence that L is false in w, and ex hypothesi L is true 
in w). Nevertheless, in w, God has the ability to accede to the petitioner’s 
request. So in w, there is something that God is able to do, in responding 
to the petitioner’s request, that would and a fortiori might result in the 
falsity of L. In which case, in w there is something the petitioner does, and 
a fortiori is able to do, which might result in the falsity of L. So in w, there 
is a law of nature (to wit, L) that is not only divinely but also humanly 
touchable; in which case premiss (3´´) of our latest modification of the 
2008 consequence argument is false.
To be sure, in the scenario described, nothing the petitioner does 
guarantees the falsity of L; with respect to the falsity of L, (the petitioning) 
man (or woman) proposes, and God disposes. But van Inwagen is quite 
clear that, in order for a proposition to be humanly “touchable”, it’s not 
necessary that a human being be able to guarantee its falsity; it’s enough if 
the human being is able to do something that might have the falsity of that 
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proposition as a consequence.8 And the petitioner does, and so a fortiori 
is able to do something that might have the falsity of L as a consequence.
Naturally, the argument just set out depends on the assumption 
that there is a possible world w in which some law of nature is divinely 
touchable, and someone could block the argument by denying the 
assumption. But  I  don’t think that someone who accepts that it’s 
metaphysically possible that there is a (traditional) God, on whose choices 
the truth of propositions such as L depend, is in a good position to deny 
that assumption. This is why I don’t think that the latest modification of 
the consequence argument is an argument that for the incompatibility of 
determinism with human free will that leaves room for the idea that a 
traditional God is possible, and determinism is accordingly compatible 
with the laws of nature being divinely and absolutely touchable (and up 
to God).
(Incidentally, if there is in fact a traditional God, of a sort who might 
accede to a petitioner’s request make it the case that, for a particular pair 
of objects b*1 and b*2, the gravitational force between b*1 and b*2 will be a 
bit less than, or a bit greater than Gm*1m*2 / r
 2, then the law of universal 
gravitation and L are not only possibly but actually humanly “touchable”, 
and not just (3´´) but also its “de-necessitation” will be false).
One might draw from these considerations the following moral:
(Unlike the thesis that every truth is humanly untouchable) determinism 
is simply too weak a thesis to be incompatible with the existence of 
human free will. What is incompatible with human free will is (roughly) 
determinism plus the human untouchability of the intrinsic character of 
the universe at any non-future time plus the human untouchability of the 
laws of nature. (If, as seems at least initially plausible, it is a necessary 
truth that the intrinsic character of the universe at any non-future time 
is humanly untouchable, we can say that what is incompatible with 
human free will is determinism plus the untouchability of the laws of 
nature.)
But that’s not the moral I would want to draw. I am in fact sympathetic 
to van Inwagen’s view that determinism by itself is incompatible with 
the existence of human free will, and inclined to think that the modal-
theological considerations adduced above don’t ultimately tell against it. 
In what follows, I shall try to explain why.
8. Cf., ibidem, p. 5.
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Once upon a time, determinism was typically defined in terms 
of causation (e.g. as the thesis that all events have causes, or – less 
implausibly – as the thesis that all events have what Aquinas would 
call “indefectible” and David Lewis would call “non-chancy” causes). 
Nowadays, it is typically understood as a thesis about (logical) implication 
– e.g. as the thesis that the facts about the intrinsic character of the universe 
throughout any initial stretch of its history, together with the facts about 
the laws of nature, (logically) imply the facts about the intrinsic character 
of the universe throughout the rest of history.
Prescinding from details about exactly which thesis, it is at least 
initially plausible that determinism can be understood as a thesis about 
the (logical) implications of maxi-specifications of intrinsic states of the 
universe and maxi-laws. So, prescinding from details about exactly which 
thesis, it is at least initially plausible that the truth of some thesis about 
the (logical) implications of maxi-specifications of intrinsic states of the 
universe and maxi-laws is sufficient for the truth of determinism. We can 
see this from the following conversation:
A:  What do you think – is determinism true?
B:  Personally, I think Laplace got it right: given complete knowledge 
of the intrinsic character of the universe at an arbitrarily chosen 
time, and complete knowledge of the laws of nature, a logically 
omniscient being would have complete knowledge of the intrinsic 
character of the universe at any time.
A : I don’t follow. Suppose Laplace was right; why should that mean 
that determinism is true?
A’s response to B strikes us as surprising, because we take it as a safe 
bet that if, as Laplace thought, a logically omniscient being would be able 
to deduce all the (complete) intrinsic states the universe ever was or is or 
will be in from any one such state, together with the laws of nature, then 
determinism is true.
We also think that it is at least not obviously (metaphysically) 
impossible that a proposition is both a law of nature, and divinely 
touchable. (Stories in which there are laws of nature that God is able to 
make false do not have the same effect on us as stories in which God is 
able to make a round square, or stories in which God is able to change 
the past.) Moreover, if we reflect, we will judge that if it is not obviously 
(metaphysically) impossible that a proposition is both a law of nature, and 
divinely touchable, then, it is not obviously (metaphysically) impossible 
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that a proposition is both a law of nature and humanly touchable. 
(Again,  stories in which the proposition that the gravitational force 
between bodies is equal to m1m2 / r
 2 is both a law of nature, and such that 
something a petitioner is able to do might result in its falsity, do not have 
the same effect on us as stories in which God is able to make a round 
square, or stories in which God is able to change the past.)
Putting all these considerations together, we seem to arrive at the 
conclusion that it is at least not obviously (metaphysically) impossible that 
determinism is true (inasmuch as (say), there is a pair of true propositions 
P0 and L, such that P0 maxi-specifies the intrinsic character of the universe 
at its first moment of existence, L is a maxi-law of nature, and P0 and L 
jointly fix the intrinsic character of the universe at every time), even though 
some laws of nature and some truths are humanly as well as divinely and 
absolutely touchable (inasmuch as there is something a petitioning creature 
is able to do that might result in the falsity of a law of nature). And if it’s 
(metaphysically) possible that determinism is true, even though some 
laws of nature and some truths are humanly touchable, then neither the 
2008 version of the consequence argument, nor the modifications thereof 
considered in this paper establish the incompatibility of determinism with 
human freedom.
All this seems plausible enough, and yet… Consider a possible world 
in which (a) up to now, the gravitational force between any two bodies 
with masses m1 and m2 has (always) been equal to Gm1m2 / r
 2., (b) someone 
has just petitioned God to make it the case that tomorrow, for a particular 
pair of bodies b*1 and b*2 with masses m*1 and m*2 the gravitational 
force between m*1 and m*2 will be a bit less than (or a bit greater than) 
Gm*1m*2 / r
 2, and (c) God has the ability to do something (in response to 
that petition) that will result in its no longer being true, as of tomorrow, 
that the gravitational force between any two bodies with masses m1 and 
m2 has always been equal to Gm1m2 / r
 2., and God has the ability to do 
something (in response to the petition) that will result in its still being 
true, as of tomorrow, that the gravitational force between any two bodies 
with masses m1 and m2 has always been equal to Gm1m2 / r
 2.. That seems 
to show that that in the possible world just described, the universe is not 
deterministic. If God (ut nunc) has the ability to respond to the petition 
in both of the ways just described, then God (ut nunc) has the possibility 
of responding to the petition in both those ways. (As Quine might have 
said, “no ability without possibility”.) If God (ut nunc) has the possibility 
of responding to the petition in both those ways, then the universe 
(ut nunc) has the possibility of being in either of two (complete) intrinsic 
states tomorrow (of having either of two intrinsic characters tomorrow). 
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And if it’s genuinely still possible / possible right now that the universe will 
have either of two intrinsic characters tomorrow, then it seems that the 
universe is not in fact deterministic: a universe that really could still end 
up in a number of different (complete) intrinsic states tomorrow is eo ipso 
not a deterministic universe. It may be that there is only one (complete) 
intrinsic state the universe could still end up in tomorrow, given the law 
of universal gravitation and the other laws included in Lw (the maxi law of 
nature in w), just as it may be that there is only one (complete) intrinsic 
state the universe could end up in tomorrow, given the (complete) truth 
about how things will go tomorrow. Be that as it may, as long as the universe 
really could end up in different (complete) intrinsic states tomorrow, then 
(we – or at least I – want to say), the universe is not deterministic.
The intuition here is that (necessarily), if the universe is deterministic. 
there is never openness about its future (intrinsic) states (i.e., that at least 
as far as the future intrinsic states of the universe are concerned, there is 
always only one way that it is still possible for things to go). Can we reconcile 
this intuition with the idea that the truth of the right sort of maxi-law and 
maxi-specification involving implication thesis is sufficient for the truth of 
determinism? Can we reconcile it with, say, the idea that necessarily, if the 
facts about the intrinsic character of the universe throughout any initial 
stretch of its history, together with the facts about the laws of nature, 
(logically) imply the facts about the intrinsic character of the universe 
throughout the rest of history, then the universe is deterministic?
It depends on what else we think. Suppose we think that the laws of 
nature are propositions such as only bodies subject to a net force accelerate, 
or bodies are never accelerated to superluminal speeds. And suppose we think 
that only bodies subject to a net force accelerate is logically weaker than 
it is inevitable that only bodies subject to a net force accelerate – and that, 
more generally, laws of nature are weaker than their “inevitabilizations”. 
On that way of thinking about laws of nature, assuming that determinism 
precludes openness (i.e. that necessarily, if the universe is deterministic, 
there is no openness about its future (intrinsic) states), maxi-law and maxi-
specification involving implication theses will be too weak to guarantee 
the truth of determinism, because they will be too weak to preclude the 
kind of openness that determinism precludes.
Suppose on the other hand we have an (admittedly not initially 
intuitive) necessitarian view of lawhood.9 That is, suppose we think 
9. See EdGiNGtoN, Dorothy – “Two Kinds of Possbility”, Aristotelian Society Supple-
mentary Volume, 78 (1), 2004, pp. 1-22.
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that (as a matter of (metaphysical) necessity), laws of nature are (meta-
physically) necessarily true. On this way of thinking about laws of nature, 
since whatever is metaphysically necessary is (permanently) inevitable, 
then – at least as long as we think the fixity of the past is necessary – there is 
no inconsistency in maintaining both that truth of the right sort of maxi-law 
and maxi-specification involving implication thesis is a sufficient condition 
for the truth of determinism, and that the fixity of all future intrinsic states 
of the universe is a necessary condition for the truth of determinism.
For our purposes, the crucial point is this: our worry about the Mark 
IV modification of the 2008 formulation of the consequence argument 
was that, at least for all we know, there are possible worlds in which some 
propositions are both laws of nature and humanly as well as divinely and 
absolutely touchable, in which case we cannot show that determinism 
implies the non-existence of human free will by appealing (inter alia) to 
the premiss that necessarily, laws of nature are not humanly touchable.
Notice, though, that in our (at least arguably) possible world in which 
the proposition that F = Gm1m2 / r
 2 is both a law of nature and humanly 
as well as divinely and absolutely touchable, at the time the petitioner 
makes her request, the future intrinsic states of the universe are not fixed: 
depending on how God responds to the petitioner, the universe could end 
up in either of two different (complete) intrinsic states tomorrow. So, for 
the reasons sketched above, I want to say that even if we assume that in 
our arguably possible world, there are two true propositions P0 and L, 
such that (i) P0 specifies the (complete) intrinsic state of the universe at 
its first moment of existence, and L is the maxi-law of nature, and (ii) P0 
and L jointly fix the intrinsic character of the universe at any every time, 
we cannot on that basis conclude that there is a possible world in which 
determinism is true, but some truths are humanly as well as divinely and 
absolutely possible.
So, I am inclined to think, when we are regard it as a truism that
if, as Laplace supposed, the whole truth about all the intrinsic states 
that the universe ever was or ever will be in can be deduced from the 
whole truth about the intrinsic states the universe is in at one moment 
together the whole truth about the laws, then determinism is true,
we are conceiving of lawhood in a certain way—a way on which it 
implies inevitability. On the other hand, when we regard it as at least 
arguably possible
that a proposition could be at once a law of nature and humanly 
touchable (as long as it was divinely as well as humanly touchable), we 
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are conceiving of lawhood in a different way – a way on which it does not 
imply inevitability, and on which the usual sorts of maxi-specification and 
maxi-law involving implication theses do not imply determinism. I do not 
want to pronounce on which is the “right” way of conceiving of lawhood 
– if indeed there is a single right way (perhaps the concept of a law is not 
determinate enough for there to be a single right way of understanding 
lawhood). But I want to suggest that the idea that the modal-theological 
considerations discussed in this paper show that (at least for all we know) 
there are deterministic worlds in which there are humanly touchable 
truths depends on a failure to clearly distinguish these two different ways 
of conceiving of lawhood.
I  have argued that, pace van Inwagen, the 2008 version of the 
consequence argument is not (as he formulates it) an argument for the 
incompatibility of determinism with free will, or even human free will, 
and that there is no straightforward way of turning it into a cogent 
argument for the incompatibility of determinism with either free will 
or human free will. I will wrap up this piece by suggesting that, on the 
assumption that determinism precludes openness, there is a streamlined 
and straightforward argument for the incompatibility of determinism 
with free will (and a fortiori human free will). The gist of that argument is:
(1*)  Necessarily, if determinism is true, then at no (past, present, or 
future) time is there more than one (still) possible future (more 
than one way the future could (still) go).
(2*)  Necessarily, if at no (past, present, or future) time is there more 
than one (still) possible future, then no proposition ever was or 
is or ever will be open (i.e., true in some (then) possible future, 
and false in some (then) possible future).
(3*)  But necessarily, if it’s not open whether P (at a time), then no one 
has a choice about whether P (at that time): I cannot (still) have 
a choice about whether P, unless it (still) might or might not be 
that P, depending on which of the things I (still) might do, I in 
fact end up doing.
(4*)  So necessarily, if no proposition ever was or is or ever will be 
open, then nobody ever has had or has or ever will have a choice 
about anything.
(5*)  And necessarily, if nobody ever has had or has or ever will have a 
choice about anything, then (in van Inwagen’s words), “free will 
simply does not exist”.
(6*)  So necessarily, if determinism is true, free will does not exist.
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In  the modified version of the 2008 consequence argument, we 
move from the supposition that determinism is true to the (permanent) 
nonexistence of (humanly) touchable truths via ancillary premisses about 
the (permanent) non-(human)-touchability of the past and present, and 
the (permanent) non-(human)-touchability of the laws of nature; we then 
move from the (permanent) nonexistence of (humanly) touchable truths 
to the (permanent) nonexistence of (human) free will., via the assumption 
that (human) free will presupposes the existence of (humanly) touchable 
truths. In the streamlined argument, we move from the supposition that 
determinism is true to the (permanent) nonexistence of open propositions; 
and we move from the (permanent) non-existence of open propositions to 
the (permanent) non-existence of free will, via the ancillary premiss that 
free will presupposes openness.
To my mind, the argument just sketched has a number of virtues 
over and above its straightforwardness. First, its premisses are all at least 
initially plausible. Second, it appears not to require any controversial 
assumptions about the laws of nature (since it leave laws of nature out of 
the argument).
Third, it doesn’t depend on any assumptions about the limitations 
of agents that might not hold for (supernatural) agents.10So, unlike the 
various modifications of the 2008 consequence argument discussed above, 
the “lawless” argument does not leave open the possibility that determinism 
is incompatible with human free will, or the free will of “natural” agents, 
rather than free will as such. I take this to be a good thing, inasmuch as 
– intuitively – determinism is no less a threat to angelic or divine freedom, 
than it is to human freedom. If I have not misunderstood him, van Inwagen 
is inclined to agree.11 (see van Inwagen, (1998), pp. 371-72).12
10. Naturally, If there is a traditional God – a God for whom “all things are possible”, 
including different continuations of the history of the world up to now – then determinism, 
as defined in the argument, is false: determinism so-defined and traditional theism are 
incompatible. But this doesn’t mean that the argument at issue depends on any assumptions 
that might not hold for supernatural agents, since the argument at issue is an argument for 
incompatibilism, not determinism.
11. See van Inwagen, “The  Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom”. In: VaN INwaGeN, 
P. & ZimmeRmaN, D. – Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008 
(e-accessible on <URL: http: /  / www.andrewmbailey.com / pvi / >), pp. 371-72.
12. Thanks to Andrea Bottani, Mario De Caro, Michele Di Francesco, Tom Pink, and 
Peter van Inwagen.
